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ABSTRACT
Diversified firms have different values than comparable portfolios of single-segment firms.
These value differences must be due to differences in either future cash flows or future returns.
Expected security returns on diversified firms vary systematically with relative value.  Discount firms
have significantly higher subsequent returns than premium firms.  Slightly more than half of the cross-
sectional variation in excess values is due to variation in expected future cash flows, with the
remainder due to variation in expected future returns and to covariation between cash flow and
returns.  
Owen Lamont Christopher Polk                                      
Graduate School of Business Kellogg Graduate School of Management
University of Chicago Northwestern University                          
1101 E. 58
th Street 2001 Sheridan Road                                
Chicago, IL 60637   Evanston, IL 60208                                 
and NBER                                                  c-polk@kellogg.nwu.edu
owen.lamont@gsb.uchicago.edu Page 1
In recent years, the average diversified firm has been worth less than a portfolio of
comparable single-segment firms.  A large literature attempts to explain this fact by
exploring ways that diversification might affect cash flows.  This literature hypothesizes
that diversification itself causes the diversified firm to generate different cash flows than
it would if separated into single-segment firms (for example, Lang and Stulz (1994),
Berger and Ofek (1995)).
A second explanation is that diversification does not affect value, but rather
merely reflects patterns in what types of firms tend to agglomerate together into
diversified firms.  If firms generating lower cash flow tend to cluster together into
conglomerates, then the fact that the average conglomerate is worth less than a
comparable portfolio of single-segment firms does not necessarily imply value
destruction.
We examine a third explanation for the diversification discount: diversified firms
have expected future asset returns that are different from the returns of single-segment
firms.  Both of the first two explanations assume that the lower value implies diversified
firms generate lower cash flows for security holders.  This implication is only true in the
special case in which the securities of both diversified firms and single-segment firms
have the same expected return.  Different securities can have different expected returns
for many reasons; explanations include risk, mispricing, taxes, and liquidity. Page 2
To decompose the diversification discount into differences in cash flows and
differences in returns, we use the fact that the price of any asset is the sum of its











where Dt is dividend paid out during period t and Pt is price at the end of period t.
"Dividends" includes all cash flows paid to the security holders (including interest
payments made to bondholders).  Equation (1) defines returns for any portfolio or asset,
including a firm's equity, a portfolio of a firm's equity and debt, or a portfolio of many
firms' securities.  Iterating forward and imposing a terminal condition on the growth of
stock prices in the infinite future,




















The value of any asset mechanically depends on future cash flows and future
returns.  Equation (2) holds for realized returns and realized cash flows.  One can also
take expectations of both sides and say that the value of any asset depends on
expectations of the interaction of future cash flows and future returns.  We describe later
how to disentangle expected returns and expected cash flows.
We define the excess value on a diversified firm as the log ratio of the value of a
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In calculating excess value, we use a portfolio of single-segment companies and
normalize this portfolio to have the same level of either sales or book assets as the
diversified firm.  Thus the price and dividends on the single-segment portfolio have been
multiplied by (for example) the ratio of the diversified firm’s current sales to single-
segment portfolio current sales.  A negative excess value is a diversification discount and
a positive excess value is a diversification premium.  Equation (3) shows that,
mechanically, the diversification discount depends on future cash flows and future
returns.
Existing research focuses on dividends (or equivalently on the economic profits
generated by the firm) and studies ways in which diversification results in lower future
dividends.  Potential explanations include incompetent or irrational managers, competent
but self-interested managers, wasteful spending in general, and wasteful investment in
poorly performing divisions in particular.  See for example Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1990), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995),
Servaes (1996), Lamont (1997), Scharfstein and Stein (1997), Scharfstein (1998), Dennis,
Dennis and Sarin (1997), and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (1999).  The competing
explanation for the diversification discount is that diversification does not cause value to
change, but merely reflects the nature of the cash-flow-generating businesses that are part Page 4
of the diversified firm (see for example Chevalier (1999) and Maksimovic and Phillips
(1999)).  Both these explanations implicitly assume that returns are the same for
diversified firms and single-segment firms.  If returns are the same, then two portfolios
can only have different scaled prices if the future scaled cash flows are different.
Our alternative approach is based on equation (2).  Other things being equal, a
diversified firm with a high expected return (relative to single-segment firms) will have a
low value and thus a discount.  A diversified firm with relatively low expected return will
have a premium.  We test whether variation in excess values is explainable using
variation in expected returns.  Specifically, we examine the difference in subsequent
returns on diversified firms and on single-segment firms.  We find that excess values
forecast future returns in the required way.  Firms with discounts have higher subsequent
returns than firms with premia.  The diversification discount puzzle is, at least in part, an
expected return phenomenon as well as an expected cash flow phenomenon.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the sample and shows
summary statistics.  Section II examines monthly portfolio returns and shows basic
results on return predictability.  Section III briefly examines three explanations for the
different returns: risk, liquidity, and mispricing.  Section IV examines present value
relations using annual data on firm returns, and shows what fraction of cross-sectional
variation in excess values is due to different returns and what fraction is due to different
cash flows.  Section V summarizes and presents conclusions.
I.  The Sample
The sample consists of firms reporting segment data in the Compustat Current and
Research database, 1979-1997.  For each segment, firms report sales, book assets, capital Page 5
expenditures, depreciation, and earnings.  In addition, Compustat assigns each segment a
four-digit SIC code based on the line of business description of the segment.  We define a
diversified firm as a firm with at least two segments, and a single-segment firm as a firm
with only one segment.  Following Berger and Ofek (1995), we discard firm-years with
segments in the financial services industry, total firm sales of less than $20 million, or
discrepancies between segment and firm data.  See the appendix for more details.
We use two measures of value.  The first is Q, the market-book ratio of the firm,
calculated as the ratio of the market value of the firm (the market value of common stock
plus the book value of debt and preferred stock) divided by the total book assets of the
firm.  The second is M, the market-sales ratio of the firm, calculated as the ratio of the
market value of the firm to total sales of the firm.
For each value measure, we calculate the ratio for a comparable portfolio of
single-segment firms.  Again following Berger and Ofek (1995), for each segment of a
diversified firm, we find a group of matching single-segment firms with similar SIC
codes.  We match either by two-, three-, or four-digit SIC code, using the highest
precision that meets the requirement of having at least 5 single-segment firms in a given
year.  We then calculate the value measure for each segment, using either the weighted
average or the median.  For weights, we use either the book value of assets for Q or sales
for M.  We then form a value measure for the entire diversified firm, dropping every
diversified firm that does not have comparable value measures for each of its segments.
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where waj is the fraction of the firm's assets that are in segment j; wsj is the fraction of the
firm's sales that are in segment j; Qi, Mi, Ai and Si are the q ratio, market-sales ratio, book
assets, and sales of single-segment company i; and segment j's industry has Nj single-
segment firms.
A.  Summary Statistics
Table I shows summary statistics for value ratios, excess values, leverage, and
returns.  Lower case letters indicate natural logs.  Table I's sample contains 14962 annual
observations for 2390 different diversified firms in the 19 year period of 1979-1997.  The
number of firms per year varies from 1031 in 1980 to 542 in 1997.  The average number
of segments per firm is 2.8.  Each segment of a diversified firm is matched with an
average of 11 single-segment firms. Page 7
Table I contains several different ways of calculating excess values.  One way is
to compare the levels; for example, to subtract mean Q and Q  to obtain a mean excess
value of -0.21.  A second way is to calculate the excess values by taking the natural
logarithm of ratio of the Q's or M's, as in Berger and Ofek (1995).  We focus on log ratios
because they are an important component of the present value calculations performed in
section IV.
Measured with log ratios, the average and median excess values are negative, and
range from –5 to -30 percent, similar to previous research.
1  Excess value is positive for
about a third of the sample (the fraction ranges from 28 percent to 40 percent across the
different measures).  We show median excess values in Table I only for comparison to
previous research.  In this paper, we necessarily concentrate on weighted average excess
values, since we need to calculate returns on the portfolio of single-segment firms.
Table I also shows the average excess values calculated by value weighting each
observation by the diversified firms' market equity value.  Table I shows that, using value
weighting, the tendency is not a discount but instead a diversification premium as high as
18 percent.  Since most of the literature on the diversification discount uses equal
weighting (as any OLS regression does), we focus on equal-weighting in this paper.
Table I shows that diversified firms have higher debt ratios than single-segment
firms.  The debt ratio, Dt, is defined as the end of year t ratio of the book value of debt to
the book value of debt plus the market value of equity (where debt includes preferred
stock).  In calculating leverage ratios for portfolios of single-segment firms, we again
weight either by book assets or by sales. Page 8
To calculate returns on the diversified firm as a whole, in principle one needs both
equity and debt returns.  We obtain equity returns for each firm from the Center for
Research in Securities Prices.  Unfortunately, debt returns are not available for most
firms.  Just using equity returns would be unwise, since leverage is systematically higher
for diversified firms than for single-segment firms (as shown in Table I).  It also turns out
that discount firms have significantly higher debt ratios than premium firms.  Thus
leverage is a potentially important confounding factor.
We therefore approximate debt returns for each firm using returns on the Lehman
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This method of calculating total returns induces two biases into our analysis, both of
which go in favor of the null hypothesis.  First, discount firms are more levered and thus
probably have riskier debt with higher expected return.  Consistent with this idea, Hecht
(1999) finds a small negative relationship between firm market-to-book ratios and actual
bond returns.  By using aggregate bond returns, we are understating total returns on
discount firms and overstating total returns on premium firms.  Second, discount firms
may have debt that has deteriorated in value and has market value below book value, so
that the calculated leverage ratios overstate actual leverage (relative to premium firms).
Since average equity returns are higher than average debt returns, we are again
understating discount firm total returns and overstating premium firm total returns.
Because we intend to test whether total returns on discount firms are higher than total
returns on premium firms, we are conservatively measuring returns in a way that is
biased against our hypothesis. Page 9
II.  Monthly portfolio returns
We now test the basic hypothesis of this paper, that excess values are related to
expected security returns on diversified firms.  We test whether realized future returns on
discount firms are significantly higher that realized future returns on premium firms, and
discuss evidence that the patterns in realized returns reflect patterns in expected returns.
In this section we test the hypothesis using simple portfolio formation rules; later, in
section IV, we test the hypothesis using regression methods.
Our portfolio formation rules follow Fama and French (1993) and are designed to
incorporate realistic timing constraints.  The basic algorithm is that each July of year t,
one sorts firms into portfolios based on information in December of year t-1.  One
examines returns on this portfolio from July of year t until June of year t+1.  We use this
timing convention to ensure that the sorting information is certainly in the information set
of investors.
Table II shows average monthly returns on diversified firms.  Panel A reports
total raw returns (that is, using no information about the returns on single-segment firms).
Panels B-E look at excess returns, defined as diversified firm returns minus returns on the
portfolio of comparable single-segment firms.  We focus on excess returns because we
are trying to explain excess value using returns on diversified firms compared to single-
segment firms.
To calculate excess returns, for each diversified firm, we go short the portfolio of
comparable single-segment firms, weighting the firms in the same manner used in
constructing excess value.  In calculating firm returns, we use year t-1 data on sales,
assets, debt ratios, and SIC codes.  The result is a zero-cost portfolio of excess (or Page 10
industry-adjusted) returns called  R R - , diversified firm returns minus returns on the
industry benchmark.
2  Our sample consists of diversified firms (approximately 714 per
month) for which at least 5 matching single-segment firms could be found for each
segment.  There are two versions of  R R - , one based on asset weights and one based on
sales weights, which correspond to the two ways of defining excess value.
Panel B shows total excess returns.  We start by discussing the first column of
Panel B, which shows excess returns for all diversified firms.  Panel B shows that
diversified firms have excess returns that are close to zero during the sample period.  In
other words, diversified firms have returns that the same as the portfolio of comparable
single-segment firms.  Rather than explain the average discount and average return for all
diversified firms, our goal in this paper is to study the cross-sectional variation in excess
values.  Specifically, we want to test whether subsequent returns are related to the level
of excess value.  We do not try to explain the average excess value because our 19-year
sample period is too short to make any strong statement about expected returns on
diversified firms.  Over short time periods, realized returns are a noisy measure of
expected returns (a point made forcefully by Elton (1999)).
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We now turn to whether discount firms have returns that are higher than premium
firms.  Each July of year t, we sort firms into portfolios based on their excess values as of
December of year t-1.  We construct two portfolios, a portfolio that buys discount firms
and a portfolio that buys premium firms.  Using raw returns, panel A shows that discount
firms have total returns that are 30 basis points per month higher than premium firms
sorting on q, and 28 basis points higher sorting on m.  These differences are statistically
significant. Page 11
Panel B shows the basic results of this paper using simple total excess returns:
premium firms have significantly lower excess returns than discount firms.  Sorting by q,
premium firms have returns that are 25 basis points per month lower than a comparable
portfolio of single-segment firms.  Discount firms have returns that are four basis points
higher than single-segment firms.  The mean excess returns of premium firms are
significantly different from zero; the mean excess return of discount firms is not.  More
importantly, the difference of 29 basis points in the excess returns is significantly
different from zero.  Sorting by m, the difference is 26 basis points per month.
Panel C shows, as expected, the difference between premium returns and discount
returns increases when using equity returns (rather than total firm returns).  Panels D and
E show results that will be useful for interpreting the analysis of section IV.  Panels D
and E show differentials similar to Panel B.
4  Across different methods, differential
returns are always above 0.2 and significant.  Panel D shows continuously compounded
(instead of simple) total returns.  Panel E shows continuously compounded total returns
forming the portfolio in January of year t, instead of in July.  This row reports average
monthly continuously compounded total firm returns earned by premium and discount
firms, from December 31
st of year t-1 to December 31
st of year t.
In summary, Table II shows that excess values forecast excess returns, so that at
least part of the diversification discount phenomenon can be explained by future returns.
The difference between discount and premium firm returns is statistically and
economically (at three to six percent per year) significant.
The returns in Table II are equal weighted in the sense that each diversified firm
in each month has the same weight in calculating the month's returns.  They are partially Page 12
size weighted in the sense that the single-segment firms are always weighted either by
sales or book assets when forming the zero cost portfolio  R R - .  An alternative method
of calculating monthly returns would be to value weight each individual  R R - by the
diversified firms' market equity value.  Fama (1998) argues that value-weighted returns
are more appropriate to use since they represent a more realistic investment strategy, and
because small stock returns are generally anomalous (in the sense that asset pricing
models fail to explain small stock returns).  He discusses cases in which value weighting
causes abnormal returns to shrink towards zero.  When we value weight the returns in
Table II (not shown), we also find that the differential return is lower and insignificant.
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Since our goal is to explain how much of the cross-sectional variation in excess
value is due to return differences, we believe equal weighting is appropriate in our
context.  We are trying to relate the diversification discount to predictable variation in
returns, and to understand the extensive literature on the diversification discount in light
of this relation.  Since the previous literature on the diversification discount uses equal
weighting, we do the same.
A.  Expected returns vs. realized returns
The present value equation (equation (2)) is true for realized returns, by
definition.  A more interesting question for financial economists is whether the cross-
sectional return patterns reflect expected returns, where “expected” means predictable in
advance by a rational agent.  Here we present evidence that shows that the variation in
returns documented in Table II was predictable ex-ante, and did not merely reflect ex-
post realizations that happened to appear during the sample period. Page 13
First, a leading story for ex post returns implies that discount firms should have
positive excess returns during the sample period, but has a hard time explaining why
premium firms should have negative excess returns.  During the sample period of 1980-
1998, many diversified firms divested unrelated subsidiaries, experienced bust-up
takeovers, went private, or took other value-enhancing actions (e.g., Comment and Jarrell
(1995), Berger and Ofek (1996)).  Under this scenario, value-destroying firms with large
discounts are most likely to take value-enhancing actions.  If these actions were a surprise
to investors, discount firms would have high returns due to high ex-post (unexpected)
returns, not due to high ex-ante (expected) returns.
Looking at simple total excess returns, panel B of Table II shows that predictable
returns on diversified firms are not being driven by discount firms who happened to
become more focused during the sample period.  Almost all of the differential is due to
premium firms underperforming their industry benchmarks.  It is harder to tell a story
about increasing corporate focus consistent with low returns for premium firms but not
high returns for discount firms.
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Second, we examine the pattern of differential returns earned over time.  If the
differential returns were concentrated in one specific time period, it would suggest that
the differential returns just happened to occur during our sample, and could have been a
surprise to investors.  If the differential returns were positive year after year, it would
suggest that expected differential returns are positive.  Whatever the role of value-
enhancing actions, if differential returns are consistently positive over time, they cannot
be caused by surprises.
Table III displays evidence on the time-series of annual differential returns on thePage 14
two strategies in Table II, Panel C,  R R - .  For each of the 18 years, we report simple
total excess returns for the 12-month period ending in June.  Sorting by q, differential
returns are positive in 14 years; sorting by m, differential returns are positive in 15 years.
The pattern appears just as strong at the end of the sample as at the beginning.  The time
patterns show that higher returns on discount firms are not just lucky draws that surprise
investors.
More general evidence from other research also supports the idea that these return
patterns are not just random.  The pattern in returns in diversified firms is an example of
the more general “value effect” in security returns: subsequent returns are negatively
correlated with value levels.  For example, looking prior to our sample period, Davis,
Fama, and French (2000) show a consistent value effect in US equities going back to the
1920’s.
 Having documented that there is substantial variation in expected returns across
diversified firms, we next turn to explaining the sources of this return predictability.
III.  Risk, liquidity, and mispricing
In judging whether expected returns drive the diversification discount, it is not
necessary to establish why expected returns on diversified firms and single-segment firms
differ.  This question is of independent interest, however.  One explanation for our results
is the value effect: stocks with high scaled prices have low subsequent returns.  At least
since Ball (1978), financial economists have argued that scaled price should contain
information about future returns.  Researchers have documented this effect in various
contexts ranging from closed-end funds to international equities.  Our contribution is to Page 15
document a case of this value effect in order that the valuation of diversified firms is not
misinterpreted as arising solely from differences in cash flows.
Explaining the value effect is beyond the scope of this paper, but in this section
we take a first pass at three explanations for the predictability of diversified firm returns.
First, we examine multifactor explanations based on risk.  Second, we examine whether
differences in liquidity explain excess values.  Third, we examine the possibility of
mispricing related to liquidity costs of trading.
A.  Multifactor risk explanations
Table IV examines in more detail the differential returns earned by portfolio
strategies which buy discount equities (and short the comparable single-segment equities)
and short premium equities (and buy the comparable single-segment equities).  It tests
whether the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model can explain these differential returns.
We use equity returns, not total firm returns, because that is what the three-factor model
is designed to explain.
The first column shows the mean return on this strategy (the same number
reported in the “Difference” column in Table II, Panel C).  The regression results in the
rest of the table show that while the differential return loads positively on the value
factor, HML, the three-factor model does not explain these equal-weighted differential
returns very well.  Sorting by q, the three-factor model explains only 9 out of the 50 basis
points of the return differential.  Sorting by m, the three-factor model describes only 11 of
the 43 basis points of the return differential.  In summary, the patterns in diversified firm
stock returns do not merely reflect loadings on the value factor.Page 16
This inability to explain returns is not unique to diversified firm returns.  Fama
and French (1993) find that for portfolios sorted on book-to-market and size, their three-
factor model does a relatively poor job explaining the returns on the smaller portfolios.
Since the differential returns in Table IV are equal-weighted, it is no surprise that the
three-factor model fails to explain them.  Along this dimension the differential returns on
diversified firms are similar to general patterns related to book-to-market.
B.  Liquidity
Capozza and Seguin (1999) reach similar conclusions to this paper.  Based on a
study of the real estate industry, they conclude that the diversification discount is not due
to differences in cash flows, and so must be due to differences in required return.  They
find suggestive evidence that differences in liquidity (measured by equity trading
volume) are positively related to differences in excess value.  The idea is that investors
demand higher expected returns to compensate for illiquidity.
An implication of Capozza and Seguin (1999), in line with Amihud and
Mendelson (1986), is that one should observe high excess returns when diversified firms
are less liquid than their comparable portfolio of single-segment firms, and low excess
returns when diversified firms are more liquid.  We test this implication using our sample
of diversified firm excess returns.  Following Capozza and Seguin (1998), we use the
dollar volume of the firm's equity to measure liquidity.  Since we look at equity volume,
we examine simple equity returns.  Again we form portfolios in July based on
information on liquidity and excess value as of the previous December.
The sample includes stocks from both NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX, trading
environments in which volume has different meanings.  To create a common measure of Page 17
volume, we use the annual percentile ranking of each stock relative to the other stocks on
its particular exchange (either NASDAQ or NYSE/AMEX) as our measure of volume.
For each diversified firm, we calculate both its percentile ranking and the weighted
average of the percentile ranking of the portfolio of matching single-segment firms,
where the weighting again uses either assets or sales.
The left hand side of Table V shows results for liquidity and returns.  It tests
whether differences in returns are monotonically related to differences in liquidity.  We
sort both diversified firms and their particular matching single-segment portfolios into
three liquidity groups, and calculate average monthly returns for the resulting nine
configurations.  For example, the upper left-hand corner of the table shows average
excess returns on diversified firms for which both the firm and its matching portfolio are
low liquidity positions.  According to the hypothesis that return differences are a function
of liquidity differences, excess returns should be decreasing as one moves northeast in
this half of the table.
Table V shows that the predicted relation between excess returns and liquidity
differences is basically present.  As predicted by the hypothesis, the lower left corner has
higher average excess returns than the upper right corner.  Though the differences
between those two corners are economically large for both sorts, those differences are not
statistically significant in either case.  When sorting by q, the difference is 36 basis points
per month with an associated t-statistic of 1.06.  The m sorts generate a difference of 39
basis points.  That estimate has a t-statistic of 1.10. Page 18
C.  Mispricing
An alternative hypothesis that explains our results is mispricing.  A version of this
hypothesis also has implications regarding liquidity and returns.  If mispricing is more
severe when it is difficult to arbitrage the mispriced assets, measures of arbitrage costs
should be related to the predictability of returns (see also Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).
Pontiff (1996) shows that closed-end fund excess values are farther from zero when
trading costs are higher.  Here, we assume that liquidity is negatively related to arbitrage
costs and test whether portfolios of illiquid securities have more predictable returns.
In contrast to the hypothesis that liquidity is monotonically related to returns, the
costly arbitrage view implies that as the illiquidity of either the diversified stocks or the
comparable single-segment firms rise, the predictability of returns should rise.  Returns
should be most predictable (based on the level of excess value) when illiquidity makes it
most difficult to take advantage of the mispricing.
The right half of Table V shows tests of the costly arbitrage hypothesis.  It shows
average excess return differentials between discount firms and premium firms.  For
example, the upper left-hand corner shows the difference between excess returns on
discount firms and premium firms, where both sets of diversified firms and their
matching portfolios have low liquidity.  According to the hypothesis that returns become
more predictable as illiquidity increases, differential excess returns should be decreasing
as one moves southeast in this part of the table.
Table V shows that the predicted relation between differential excess returns and
liquidity differences is weak at best.  The hypothesis implies that the upper left corner
should have higher average differential excess returns than the lower right corner, which Page 19
is true for both sorting methods.  However the differences are statistically insignificant
(the q sorts produce a difference of 12 basis points with an associated t-statistic of 0.36
while sorting by m generates a difference of 0.30 with an associated t-statistic of .97).
Moreover, there is no obvious pattern of decreasing differential returns as one moves
southeast across all nine portfolios.
In summary, we find no statistically convincing evidence linking liquidity-based
explanations suggested by Capozza and Seguin (1998) and Amihud and Mendelson
(1986) to our results.  We also find no evidence supporting costly arbitrage explanations
like those in Pontiff (1996).  However, both investigations are certainly far less complete
than previous work.  We do find that differential returns are related to returns on the
value factor of Fama and French (1993), but not well explained by their model.  Thus we
are unable to answer the question of why expected returns on diversified firms and
single-segment firms differ; we are only able to document that they do differ.
IV.  Present value relations
In this section we study the variance of excess values and use a dynamic model of
returns and value ratios to decompose the cross-sectional variance into components due
to cash flow and returns.  The variance of excess values, Var( t t q q - ) or Var( t t m m - ),
is the cross-sectional variance across all firm-years (which is shown in standard deviation
form in Table I).  This is the same object of interest in any regression with excess values
as the dependent variable, as performed in the many papers on the diversification
discount.
The Campbell and Shiller (1988) log-linear approximation to the definition ofPage 20
return in equation (1) is:
k p d p r t t t t + - - + » + + + 1 1 1 ) 1 ( r r (9)
where r is a continuously compounded return and lower case letters indicate natural logs.
k is an constant coming from the approximation, which drops out below.
The parameter r is the inverse of one plus the ratio of dividends to market value,
and is a discounting parameter that is close to one.  In the context of this paper, dividends
include interest payments.  Using our assumptions about corporate debt returns, we
calculated r and found it to be 0.96 for both diversified firms and for single-segment
firms.
7  Thus we use 0.96 in our calculations.
Equation (9) holds either for diversified firms or for portfolios of single-segment
firms.  Subtracting the two,
( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t p p d d p p r r - - - - + - = - + + + + + + 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( r r (10)
In equation (10), one can scale the portfolio of single-segment firms so that it has
the same level of sales or assets as the diversified firm, by multiplying prices and
dividends by the ratio of the scaling variables.  This renormalization has no effect on the
left side of the equation, and allows one to use value ratios instead of actual prices in
equation (10).  It also means that dividends should be interpreted as the ratio of dividends
to sales or to assets. Page 21
Iterating (10) forward and taking expected values of both sides, excess value is
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 + + + +
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This equation imposes the condition that the log dividend price ratio does not follow an
explosive process.  Introducing some notation, equation (11) can be rewritten as
r d t t = p p h h - - (12)
Excess values consist of two parts.  The first, hd, is the sum of discounted future
excess dividends (multiplied by 1-r).  The second, hr, enters with a negative sign and is
the sum of discounted future excess returns.  Equation (11) is a completely atheoretical
approximation to a dynamic accounting identity.  It does not assume that financial
markets are efficient or that market participants are rational.  The terms "expected
returns" and "expected dividends" refer to the rational expectation of returns and
dividends, where the rational person is the econometrician not necessarily the investor.
A.  Estimating the dynamic behavior of discounts and returns
Section II showed that excess values are related to subsequent returns using the
standard, non-parametric, portfolio approach.  In contrast, in this section we take a highly
parametric approach that imposes homogeneity across all firms and years.  We model the
evolution of returns and value ratios using a vector autoregression (VAR).  Let
[ ] t t t t p p r r = , , , ¢
t x (13)
be the vector of  returns and value ratios.  We can represent the joint time-series behavior
of returns and excess values using a first-order VAR:
1 t t 1 t e Ax c = x + + + + (14)
Where A is a 4x4 matrix of coefficients, c is a 4x1 vector of constants, and e is a 4x1 Page 22
vector of error terms.  Define e1 as the vector [1 0 0 0]' and e2 as [0 1 0 0]'.  After matrix
algebra using equation (14), one can calculate the sum of discounted expected returns as
( ) ( ) c I I A e2 e1 Ax A e2 e1 t
1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ' ' ) ( ' '
- - - - - - - - - r r r h I I = r (15)
Using equation (12), hd is then simply calculated as  r t t p p h + - .
The second term in equation (15) is a constant term that is the same for all firms.
As discussed before, our goal is to examine the variance of excess values across firms,
not to explain the average discount.  In calculating variances, the second term in equation
(15) plays no role.
We estimate A using an annual VAR with log value ratios and continuously
compounded returns.  The VAR is estimated using four OLS regressions.  The
regressions require that the firm has annual returns and excess value ratios in both year
t+1 and year t (so that the firm must exist from the end of year t-1 to the end of year t+1).
The data requirements cut the sample size substantially, compared to Table II.
Table VI shows VAR results.  The first row, for example, shows coefficients from
an OLS regression of annual diversified firm continuously compounded total returns on
lagged returns and lagged value ratios, where the regression pools all firm-years.  Again,
each firm's total return is the weighted average of returns on the firm's equity and
aggregate bond returns, using the firm's beginning of year debt ratio.  The standard errors
have been adjusted for correlation of the residuals within years, and for
heteroskedasticity.
8
Table VI shows that lagged own value ratio is a strong and reliable predictor of
future firm returns.  The negative coefficient on lagged value ratio (-0.11 using q and Page 23
-0.05 using m) reflects the value effect.  Firms with high scaled prices have low
subsequent returns.
Industry value ratios seem to contain no predictive information for firm returns or
industry returns.
9  For value ratios, there is some tendency for firm ratios to move
towards industry ratios, indicated by the coefficient of 0.05 on lagged industry value
ratios.  Since industry value ratios are not helpful in forecasting returns, this convergence
probably reflects movement in the scaling variable (either sales or book assets).  Both
firm value ratios and industry value ratios are strongly persistent (with coefficients of
above 0.8 on own lags).
Using the coefficients of A defined by the regression coefficients, we calculate
d h and  r h  and decompose the variance of excess values.  The variance decomposition
implied by the dynamics of returns and excess values uses the fact that Var( t t p p - ) =
Var( d h )+Var( r h )-2Cov( r h , d h ).  Table VI shows the contribution of these three
components, normalizing each component by Var( t t p p - ) so that they sum to one.  The
variance decomposition is a highly nonlinear function of the regression coefficients;
asymptotic standard errors are calculated using the delta method and the estimated
covariance matrix (see Campbell (1991) and Hodrick (1992)).
The variance decomposition shows that slightly more than half (54 percent using
q and 0.57 percent using m) of the cross-sectional variance of excess values can be
explained by the differences in expected future cash flows.  This fraction is significantly
less than one.  The remaining variation in excess values is attributable to differences in
future returns and to the covariation term.  The fractions of variance contributed by future
returns and by covariance of returns with cash flows are each significantly different from Page 24
zero.  This decomposition shows the quantitative importance of predictable returns in
explaining variation in excess values.  If returns were totally unpredictable (so that all the
coefficients in the predictive equation for returns were zero), then the procedure would
mechanically attribute 100 percent of the variation to differences in future cash flows and
zero to the other terms.
Another implication of the variance decomposition is that if one runs a cross-
sectional regression with excess value on the left-hand side and only cash-flow related
terms on the right-hand side, one should not be able to get an R-squared over 54-57
percent (assuming the cash flow variables used are uncorrelated with expected returns).
For example, Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) regress excess values
on size, earnings, investment, etc.  They report R-squared’s in the 5-11 percent range, so
the implied upper bound is not hard to satisfy.
The covariance term (28 percent using q and 36 percent using m) is substantial.
The negative correlation of  r h and  d h means that when a diversified firm has a high
expected return (and thus a low excess value due to differences in returns), it also tends to
have a low excess value due to differences in cash flows.  Put differently, the return effect
tends to magnify the cash flow effect.  One could describe this covariance as consistent
with "over-reaction," in the sense that firms with low cash flow prospects tend to have
bigger discounts than suggested by cash flows alone.
B.  Regression sample and robustness checks
Unlike Table II, Table VI’s annual returns do not represent implementable trading
strategies.  First, the returns only include firms with complete returns for the entire year.
Thus both diversified and single-segment returns are subject to survivorship bias.Page 25
Second, the returns are from January 1 to December 31; there may be a substantial time
lag between January 1 and the time a firm's data actually becomes available.
To evaluate the importance of these selection biases, we here compare the return
characteristics of Tables II and VI.  Calculating the annual continuously compounded
total return for Table VI’s sample, and comparing subsequent returns on discount firms
and premium firms, produces a differential return of 3.7 percent (31 basis points per
month) using q and 4.0 percent (34 basis points per month) using m.  Thus the results on
differential r r -  are nearly identical to the last row of Table II for q, and are similar for
m.
 The homogenous VAR estimated in Table VI is obviously a gross simplification
of reality.  See Campbell (1991) and Hodrick (1992) for an examination of how well
VAR’s work in the case of aggregate returns, and Vuolteenaho (1999) for an examination
of cross-sectional VAR’s similar to ours.  Given the traditional emphasis on medians in
the diversification literature, one might also worry that outliers heavily influence our
results.  One way of assessing the ability of our simple model to represent reality is to see
whether it can match important characteristics of the data.  Using the results from the first
two regressions in Table VI, we form annual forecasts for differential returns for discount
firms and for premium firms.  We find that the forecasts closely match the realized
differential returns: the forecast is 4.0 percent (vs. 3.7 percent actual) using q and 3.8
percent (vs. 4.0 percent actual) using m.
We now report further robustness checks on Table VI.  First, Fama-Macbeth
estimation produces regression results similar to the ones in Table VI, with the fraction of
variance attributable to Var( d h ) rising to 0.64 for q and 0.60 and m.
 10  Second, we triedPage 26
dropping extreme values, defined as any observation in which any one of the eight
current or lagged variables was in the top or bottom 5 percent of its distribution.  Using
this sample (about half as large as the baseline sample) produces similar results, with the
fraction of variance attributable to Var( d h ) of 0.58 for q and 0.67 and m.  Third, adding
fixed year effects also produces similar results, with the fraction of variance staying at
0.54 for q and 0.57 for m (here "variance” means the variance of deviation from annual
average).
In summary, we have no reason to believe that either selection biases or outliers
are quantitatively important for our variance decomposition.
C.  Deviations from firm-specific averages
The homogenous model of Table VI forces all firms to have the same coefficients.
This constraint implies that all firms have the same long-run value ratio, for example, and
does not allow different firms to have permanently different expected returns or different
expected cash flows.  An alternative estimation strategy is to allow firm-specific fixed
effects.  By including firm fixed effects in the regression, one allows the long-run level of
excess value to differ for each firm and models the dynamic behavior of excess values
around this long-run mean.  By "firm fixed effects" we mean a different dummy variable
for each diversified firm and each matching portfolio of single-segment firms.  Fixed firm
effects substantially change the nature of the variance decomposition.  Of the cross-
sectional variance in excess value, about 69 percent for q (74 percent for m) is explained
by firm fixed effects alone.  Fixed effects sweep away the constant firm-specific
component of both cash flows and returns.  Instead of decomposing the cross-sectionalPage 27
variance of excess values, one is now decomposing the cross-sectional variance of
deviations of excess values from firm-specific means.
Thus a decomposition of within-firm variation in excess values is likely to be
substantially different than a decomposition of cross-sectional variation.  However, since
several papers investigating the diversification discount use firm fixed effects regressions
(for example Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (1999) and Campa and Kedia  (1999)), it is
useful to estimate the relative contributions of cash flows and returns in this situation.
A complication in estimating the VAR is that fixed effects estimation in panel
data, in the presence of a lagged dependent variable, produces biased results (which are
large when the number of periods is small and the variable is highly autocorrelated).  A
standard remedy is to first difference the equation and use lagged levels to instrument
(see Hsiao (1986)).  Table VII shows instrumental variables estimates of the first
difference of equation (14),  1 t t 1 t x A = x + + + D D e , where we instrument for Dxt using xt-1.
In general, the coefficients of A in Table VII are similar to those in Table VI.  The
variance decomposition results are also similar, with an attribution to Var( d h ) of 0.60 for
q and 0.42 for m.  Although these point estimates are similar, the standard errors rise
substantially so that for q, one can no longer reject the hypothesis that all variance in
excess value deviations is due to cash flow components.
Summarizing the robustness results, while different methodologies produce
somewhat different estimates, all estimates of the fraction of cross-sectional variance
attributable only to cash flows are less than one.  The estimates range from 0.42 to 0.75.Page 28
D.  Are diversified firms special?
As discussed previously, one explanation of our results is simply that the value
effect is present in diversified firm stock returns.  This explanation leads naturally to the
question of whether diversified firms are in any way different from single-segment firms.
Single-segment firms also have value ratios that (for individual firms) are not always
identical to the value ratios of their matching portfolio.  These differences again must be
due to either differences in future returns or in future cash flows.  Do the sources of
variation in industry-adjusted value ratios look the same for single-segment firms?
To answer this question, we formed excess value ratios and excess returns for
single-segment firms.  For each single-segment firm, we form a benchmark portfolio of
other single-segment firms in the same industry, using the same matching and weighting
algorithm as before.  When forming the industry benchmark, we exclude the target firm
from the set of possible matching firms.  The resulting sample of firms is larger than the
sample of diversified firms, with about 22 thousand observations on firms that meet the
VAR's data requirements.
Table VIII shows results from a vector autoregression using single-segment firms
instead of diversified firms.  Looking first at the regression coefficients, the results are
quite similar to Table VI.  Like diversified firms, single-segment firm returns are
negatively related to their value ratio.  Like diversified firms, single-segment firms have
excess value ratios that are highly persistent and that have a slight tendency to converge
towards industry benchmark levels.
Looking at the variance decomposition, the comparison is slightly more
ambiguous.  For m, the variance decomposition for single-segment firms looks quitePage 29
similar to the variance decomposition for diversified firms, with the fraction of variance
attributable to Var( d h ) at 67 percent.  For q, the results are somewhat different.  The
fraction of variance attributable to Var( d h ) is 89 percent, and one cannot reject the
hypothesis that the fraction is one.
On the other hand, there certainly is some predictability of returns and that
predictability creates sizeable and statistically significant variance of  r h which happens to
be offset by the covariance term.  And the confidence interval for variance attributable to
Var( d h ) for q goes down to 0.49, so Table VIII does not present strong evidence that
single-segment firms are different than diversified firms.
These findings suggest that there is nothing special about diversified firms.  The
effect we find, that excess values are negatively correlated with subsequent returns,
simply reflects the well-known value effect in stocks.  Stocks with high scaled prices
have low subsequent returns, and this holds true for both single-segment and
multisegment firms.
V.  Conclusions
We show that firms with diversification discounts have high subsequent returns
and firms with premia have low subsequent returns.  This pattern in diversified firm
returns is a manifestation of the familiar value effect, previously documented in the cross
section of average equity returns for all firms.  Current asset valuations are negatively
related to future returns.
Since returns are consistently higher for discount firms than premium firms, we
argue that expected returns are also higher for discount firms than premium firms.  The
pattern of returns does not appear to reflect surprises or news that happened to occur inPage 30
the sample period.  Thus the diversification puzzle is both an expected return
phenomenon and an expected cash flow phenomenon.
Using simple present value relations and a first order vector autoregression, we
estimate the fraction of the cross-sectional variance of excess values that can be attributed
to differences in future cash flows.  We find that slightly more than half of the variance is
due to future cash flow differences between diversified firms and single-segment firms,
with the remaining half due to differences in future returns and the covariance between
returns and cash flows.
Since our results are based on the cross-sectional variation in excess values, they
say nothing about why the average diversified firm is worth less than the sum of its parts.
Nevertheless, one can speculate that the same effect that explains deviations from
average might also explain the average.Page 31
A. APPENDIX
A.  Data Sources and Definitions
Our data on segments comes from several Current and Research segment files
obtained from Wharton Research Data Services in April 1999.  Our firm-level Compustat
and CRSP data comes from the University of Chicago’s CRSP, in August 1999.  Total
returns on the Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond Index are provided by Ibbotson
Associates.  In our calculation of market value, we use CRSP market equity.
We define our Q measure as {market capitalization (from CRSP) + book assets
(data item 6) - book equity (data item 60) - deferred taxes (data item 74)} / book assets
(data item 6).  We define leverage as total debt / (total debt + market capitalization)
where total debt is defined as long-term debt (data item 9) + debt in current liabilities
(data item 34) + redemption value of preferred stock (data item 56).  We define our
measure M as (total debt + market capitalization) / net sales (data item 12).
In some cases, CRSP recorded delisting prices several months after the security ceased
trading and thus after a period of missing returns.  In these cases, we calculated the total
return from the last available price to the delisting price, and pro-rated this return over the
intervening months.
For firms with multiple classes of stock, in calculating market equity and stock
returns, we aggregate all separate classes of stock together into one value-weighted
portfolio.Page 32
B.  Screening
We drop firm-years if any of the following conditions hold: it has missing or
nonpositive firm sales or firm assets; missing or nonpositive (for any segment) segment
sales or segment assets; has any segment which Compustat assigns an 1-digit SIC code of
0, 6 (financial), or 9 (largely "NO OPERATIONS"); the sum of segment sales is not
within 1 percent of the total sales of the firm; the firm changes the month of its fiscal
year-end such that in December of year t-1 our latest information is from year t-2. We
also drop firms (such as GM) who report multiple firm totals for the same year (firms
which report different Compustat total sales for the same CRSP permanent company
identifier number).
When calculating monthly returns, we also impose a constraint to deal with
Compustat backfilling (a practice which may induce survivorship bias).  We require that
firms have at least two years of COMPUSTAT data prior to year t.Page 33
FOOTNOTES
                                                
1 In interpreting the values it is important to note that logarithms are concave functions.
Since firm-level variables are more volatile than industry-level variables, average log
ratios tend to be negative.  For example, mean Q is above mean  Q , but mean  q q -  is
negative.
2 We do not require that either the diversified firm or the single-segment firm is present
for the entire period.  If a firm exits from the CRSP database, we drop it from the
portfolio using the delisting return.
3 In the context of diversified firms, Lang and Stulz (1995) argue that the ex-post
performance of diversified firms is a potentially misleading measure of ex ante valuation
effects because of (p. 1253) " unexpected technological and regulatory changes."
4 Using continuously compounded excess returns, diversified firms have negative excess
returns.  Using simple total excess returns, diversified firms have positive excess returns.
This apparent contradiction reflects the concavity of natural logs mentioned in footnote 1.
5 For the ten differential returns reported in Table II, the mean differential ranges between
-0.06 and 0.13.  The differential is negative four out of ten times.  All ten estimates are
insignificant.
6 Another piece of evidence against this argument appears in section IV, where we
examine differential returns for those firms that have complete annual returns for a given
calendar year.  These annual returns are relevant to the extent that this ex-post story
involves value-enhancing actions that result in delisting from CRSP.  The results using
annual returns are quite similar to the results from Table II, showing the difference inPage 34
                                                                                                                                                
returns for discount and premium firms is not driven by firms that delist in the subsequent
year.
7 For each firm, we calculated the ratio of annual cash flow to end-of-year market value
using dividend payments and interest payments.  For interest payments, we used the
firm's leverage ratio and the income component of the Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond
Index.  We found that average r was 0.956 for diversified firms and 0.962 for the
comparable portfolio of single-segment firms (using either asset weighting or sales
weighting).  Campbell (1991) uses a monthly r of 0.9962 that translates into 0.955
annually for the aggregate stock market.
8 The robust standard errors allow for clustered sampling (dependence of observations
within each year).  See Rogers (1993).
9 Cohen and Polk (1999) decompose book-to-market ratios into inter- and intra-industry
components, and similarly find that the value effect is primarily intra-industry.
10 Stambaugh (1999) discusses a small sample bias in time-series predictive regressions
of returns on lagged scaled values.  Since our regression has a time-series dimension as
well as a cross-sectional dimension, it is subject to this bias.  Since the pooled OLS
results are so similar to the Fama-Macbeth results (which are based on purely cross-
sectional regressions with no time-series dimension), the bias is unimportant in our
sample.Page 35
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Table I
Value ratios and leverage ratios for diversified firms, 1979-1997
Lower case letters indicate natural logarithm.  Q is the market-book ratio.  M is the market-sales
ratio.  D is the debt ratio, defined as the book value of the debt divided by the book value of the
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, where waj is the fraction of the firm's assets that
are in segment j; Qi, and Ai are the q ratio and book assets of single-segment company i; and
segment j's industry has Nj single-segment firms.  The comparable portfolio variables for M are
defined similarly using sales weights.  The sample consists of all diversified firms for which at
least 5 matches could be found for every segment.  “Value Weight”  indicates weighting by
market value of the diversified firm's equity.  There are 14962 annual observations.





Q 1.35 1.15 0.72 0.35 16.27 1.98 1.00
Q 1.56 1.44 0.56 0.64 8.05 1.83 1.00
MEDIAN Q 1.34 1.24 0.42 0.62 6.15 1.56 1.00
M 1.12 0.75 1.44 0.02 57.20 1.89 1.00
M 1.28 1.06 0.87 0.11 12.98 1.76 1.00
MEDIAN M 1.09 0.87 0.79 0.08 12.74 1.49 1.00
q q - -0.18 -0.19 0.39 -2.02 2.17 0.02 0.28
MEDIAN q q - -0.05 -0.07 0.36 -1.94 2.31 0.16 0.40
m m - -0.30 -0.29 0.63 -3.78 2.97 -0.01 0.30
MEDIAN m m - -0.13 -0.13 0.61 -3.78 3.16 0.18 0.40
WEIGHT ASSET D D - 0.05 0.02 0.23 -0.71 0.83 -0.06 0.53
WEIGHT SALES D D - 0.06 0.02 0.22 -0.70 0.83 -0.05 0.55Page 39
Table II
Time-series average monthly returns for diversified firms, 1980-1998
Average monthly returns in percent.  Excess returns are returns in excess of the industry
benchmark.  Total returns are a linear combination, using firm leverage, of returns on firm equity
and returns on aggregate corporate debt.  Panel A has an average of 838 diversified firms per
month, 1980:7-1998:12.  Panels B-D have an average of 714 diversified firms per month,
1980:7-1998:12.  Panel E has an average of 750 diversified firms per month, 1980:1-1998:12.










A) R: Simple total raw returns, July year t - June year t+1
Based on q and 1.19 0.97 1.27 0.30
asset weights (0.23) (0.26) (0.22) (0.08)
Based on m and 1.19 0.99 1.27 0.28
sales weights (0.23) (0.24) (0.22) (0.06)
B)  R R - : Simple total excess returns, July year t - June year t+1
Based on q and -0.04 -0.25 0.04 0.29
asset weights (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)
Based on m and -0.07 -0.25 0.00 0.26
sales weights (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
C)  R R - : Simple equity excess returns, July year t - June year t+1
Based on q and 0.02 -0.34 0.15 0.50
asset weights (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)
Based on m and -0.02 -0.32 0.10 0.43
sales weights (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
D)  r r - : Continuously compounded total excess returns, July year t - June year t+1
Based on q and -0.27 -0.56 -0.16 0.40
asset weights (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11)
Based on m and -0.29 -0.50 -0.21 0.30
sales weights (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
E)  r r - : Continuously compounded total excess returns, Jan. year t - Dec. year t
Based on q and -0.23 -0.46 -0.14 0.32
asset weights (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Based on m and -0.26 -0.44 -0.19 0.25
sales weights (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)Page 40
Table III
Annual differential returns on diversified firms, 1980-1998
Annual percent returns on the simple total excess return differential strategy in the last column of
Table II, Panel B, July year t - June year t+1.
























98 7.53 9.07Page 41
Table IV
Three-factor regressions on simply monthly equity returns, 1980-1997
( R R - )DISCOUNT - ( R R - )PREMIUM  = a + bRMRF + sSMB + hHML
The dependent variable is the difference between simple equity excess returns on discount firms
and premium firms, from the last column of Table II, Panel C.  The independent variables are
from Fama and French (1993) and include RMRF, the market return minus the risk-free return;
SMB, the size factor; and HML, the market-to-book factor.  The mean repeats information from
Table II which has sample 1980:7-1998:12.  The regression results reflect the sample 1980:7-
1997:12.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Mean a b s h R2
( R R - )DISCOUNT - ( R R - )PREMIUM 0.50 0.41 -0.01 0.17 0.37 0.33
sorted on  q q - (0.11) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
( R R - )DISCOUNT - ( R R - )PREMIUM 0.43 0.32 0.02 0.19 0.38 0.36
sorted on  m m - (0.11) (0.09) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)Page 42
Table V
Dollar volume and monthly returns on diversified firms, 1980-1998
Dollar volume is the average of all available monthly dollar trading volume of a firm from
January t-1 to December t-1.  Each year, we calculate the dollar volume percentile ranking on
each type of exchange (NYSE/AMEX or Nasdaq) for all firms, both diversified and single-
segment.  We then calculate the (asset or sales-weighted) matched dollar volume percentile
ranking for each diversified firm's single-segment matching portfolio.  Each year we sort all
diversified firms on the diversified firm's dollar volume percentile ranking into three portfolios.
We independently sort all diversified firms on the diversified firm's matched portfolio dollar
volume percentile ranking.  From the intersection of these two sorts we form nine portfolios.  We
then calculate the equal-weighted excess return over the period July t to June t+1 on these
portfolios as well as the difference between the excess returns on the discount and premium
subsets within each portfolio.  We report below the time-series average return on these
portfolios.  The nine portfolios have an average of 74 stocks over the 19 year period with
approximately seventy percent of the diversified firms within each of the nine portfolios being
discount firms.  The sample period is 1980:7-1998:12.  Nasdaq firms are in the sample from
1984:7-1998:12 as a full year of volume information for those firms becomes available on CRSP
in 1983.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
R R - ( R R - )DISCOUNT -
( R R - )PREMIUM
Diversified firm volume
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Low 0.16 -0.14 -0.22 0.44 0.51 0.07
Single (0.16) (0.10) (0.16) (0.30) (0.22) (0.19)
Based on q and segment Medium 0.36 0.10 -0.09 0.68 0.54 0.19
     asset weights firm (0.18) (0.12) (0.11) (0.34) (0.22) (0.19)
volume High 0.14 -0.07 -0.09 0.84 0.74 0.32
(0.24) (0.13) (0.09) (0.44) (0.23) (0.15)
Low 0.13 -0.12 -0.29 0.67 0.37 0.47
Single (0.15) (0.11) (0.16) (0.30) (0.22) (0.20)
Based on m and segment Medium 0.31 0.03 -0.07 0.58 0.36 0.20
     sales weights firm (0.17) (0.11) (0.12) (0.33) (0.22) (0.18)
volume High 0.09 -0.11 -0.13 -0.32 0.48 0.36
(0.25) (0.13) (0.09) (0.56) (0.26) (0.15)Page 43
Table VI
Dynamic behavior of annual returns and values ratios for diversified firms and matching
portfolios, 1981-1997
Vector autoregression results using pooled OLS estimation. The regression is
1 t t 1 t e Ax c = x + + + +  where  [ ] t t t t p p r r = , , , ¢
t x  is the vector of returns and value ratios.  The
sample consists of 8698 diversified firm-years that have excess values and excess returns for two
consecutive years.  Using the estimated coefficients, we forecast future returns for each firm and
calculate hd and hr.  hd  is a function of the sum of discounted future excess dividends, and hr is
the sum of discounted future excess returns.  We decompose the variance of excess values using
Var( t t p p - ) = Var( d h )+Var( r h )-2Cov( r h , d h ).  The variances and covariances have been
normalized by Var( t t p p - ).  The standard errors are calculated allowing for both
heteroskedasticity and for the residuals to be correlated within each of the 17 years.  Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Constant t r t r t p t p R2 Var( d h ) Var( r h ) -2Cov( r h , d h )
Using q and assets weights
1 + t r 0.15 0.04 -0.15 -0.11 0.01 0.03 0.54 0.18 0.28
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09)
1 + t r 0.16 -0.02 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.03)
1 + t p 0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.82 0.05 0.70
(0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
1 + t p 0.10 -0.01 -0.15 0.00 0.86 0.70
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.01) (0.03)
Using m and sales weights
1 + t r 0.12 0.01 -0.14 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.57 0.07 0.36
(0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05)
1 + t r 0.15 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02)
1 + t p 0.01 -0.06 -0.12 0.89 0.05 0.84
(0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
1 + t p 0.09 -0.03 -0.19 0.03 0.85 0.80
(0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.01) (0.02)Page 44
Table VII
Dynamic behavior of first-differences in annual returns and values ratios for diversified firms
and matching portfolios, 1982-1997
Vector autoregression results on differenced data using instrumental variables estimation.  The
regression is  1 t t 1 t x A = x + + + D D e  where  [ ] 1 1 1 1 , , , - - - - - - - - ¢ D t t t t t t t t p p p p r r r r = t x  is the vector
of first-differenced returns and value ratios.  The sample consists of 6761 diversified firm-years
that have excess values and excess returns for three consecutive years.  We instrument for Dxt
using xt-1..  Using the estimated coefficients, we forecast future returns for each firm and
calculate hd and hr.  hd  is a function of the sum of discounted future excess dividends, and hr is
the sum of discounted future excess returns.  We decompose the variance of excess values using
Var( t t p p - ) = Var( d h )+Var( r h )-2Cov( r h , d h ).  The variances and covariances have been
normalized by Var( t t p p - ).  The standard errors are calculated allowing for both
heteroskedasticity and for the residuals to be correlated within each of the 16 years.  Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Constant D t r D t r D t p D t p Var( d h ) Var( r h ) -2Cov( r h , d h )
Using q and assets weights
D 1 + t r 0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.26 -0.11 0.60 0.09 0.32
(0.04) (0.03) (0.15) (0.15) (0.34) (0.34) (0.13) (0.24)
D 1 + t r 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.13 -0.13
(0.04) (0.03) (0.17) (0.17) (0.35)
D 1 + t p 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.59 -0.09
(0.03) (0.02) (0.12) (0.13) (0.20)
D 1 + t p 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.14 0.52
(0.03) (0.02) (0.14) (0.13) (0.30)
Using m and sales weights
D 1 + t r 0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.26 0.03 0.42 0.22 0.36
(0.04) (0.03) (0.16) (0.15) (0.23) (0.23) (0.20) (0.32)
D 1 + t r 0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.20) (0.16) (0.28)
D 1 + t p 0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.60 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22)
D 1 + t p 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.06 0.61
(0.04) (0.05) (0.23) (0.19) (0.27)Page 45
Table VIII
Dynamic behavior of annual returns and values ratios for single-segment firms and matching
portfolios, 1981-1997
Vector autoregression results using pooled OLS estimation. The regression is
1 t t 1 t e Ax c = x + + + +  where  [ ] t t t t p p r r = , , , ¢
t x  is the vector of returns and value ratios.  The
sample is 22015 single-segment firm-years that have excess values and excess returns for two
consecutive years. Using the estimated coefficients, we forecast future returns for each firm and
calculate hd and hr.  hd  is a function of the sum of discounted future excess dividends, and hr is
the sum of discounted future excess returns.  We decompose the variance of excess values using
Var( t t p p - ) = Var( d h )+Var( r h )-2Cov( r h , d h ).  The variances and covariances have been
normalized by Var( t t p p - ).  The standard errors are calculated allowing for both
heteroskedasticity and for the residuals to be correlated within each of the 17 years.  Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Constant t r t r t p t p R2 Var( d h ) Var( r h ) -2Cov( r h , d h )
Using q and assets weights
1 + t r 0.13 0.05 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.89 0.29 -0.18
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.12) (0.31)
1 + t r 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.03)
1 + t p 0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.82 0.02 0.69
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
1 + t p 0.09 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.88 0.74
(0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.03)
Using m and sales weights
1 + t r 0.08 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.67 0.12 0.22
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07)
1 + t r 0.14 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.02)
1 + t p -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.88 0.05 0.83
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01)
1 + t p 0.07 -0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.90 0.85
(0.03) (0.01) (0.08) (0.00) (0.02)